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This case presents a simple question: 
Has the Corporation Court of the City of 
Norfolk jurisdiction to entertain a bill in equity 
under section 52 59 of the Code? · 
It is respectfully submitted that the answer to this 
question should be in the negative. 
The last sentence of section 52 59 of the Code ha~ 
given rise to this question. But for this sentence, the 
incapacity of the Corporation Court to exercise such 
jurisdiction would not be disputed. This sentence was 
first incorporated in the statute by the Revisors of 1919. 
See their note to this section. Prior to that time the 
jurisdiction of the Corporation Court had remained pre-
cisely as it was under the Act of February 12, 1894, 
establishing the Court of Law and Chancery. See Acts 




all equity jurisdiction had been taken from the Corpor-
ation Court, and it t:emains today without any such 
jurisdiction, unless it has been given by implication by 
the last sentence of section 5259 of the Code. We say 
by implication advisedly, because this statute is not one 
dealing with jurisdiction at all, but dealing with the 
probate of wills. 
The Act of February 12, 1894, establishing the 
Court of Law and Chancery and curtailing the juris-
diction of the Corporation Court, was made a part of 
the Code of 1919 without any change. This alone ought 
to make it plain that it was not the intention of the 
Revisors of 1919, or of the Legislature when it enacted 
the Code, to alter or affect in any way the jurisdiction 
of the two Courts. To retain as a part of the Code a 
statute which had previously taken away equity juris-
diction, and then to confer such jurisdiction by another 
section, is an inconsistency of which it is not to be" 
supposed that the Revisors were guilty. As was said 
by the Supreme Court of Appeals in the case of Legal 
Club v. Light, 137 Va., 249, urevisors of statutes are 
presumed not to change the law if the language which 
they use fairly admits of a construction which makes 
it consistent with the former statutes." Moreover, where 
there has been a general codification, the presumption 
is that the old law was not intended to be changed unless 
a contrary intention should plainly appear in the new. 
See Keister v. Keister, 123 Va., 157. 
Such being the rules of construction which apply 
in this case, it is submitted that it was never intended 
by the Revisors, or by the Legislature, that the last 
sentence of section 5259 should restore to the Corpor-
ation Court any of the jurisdiction which had been taken 
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from it. It is admitted that this sentence does present 
some difficulty; but it is further submitted that this 
difficulty is not so great as to make the general rule 
inapplicable. The sentence in question can be given 
its proper scope by construing it to mean that no bill 
under section 52 59 shall be filed except in the court in 
which, or in the clerk's office of which, the will was 
admitted to probate-Provided, al?.vays, such court be 
a co-urt having equity jurisdiction. These italcised words, 
we submit, do no violence to the statute, but, on the 
contrary, are consistent with its language. If the words 
we have suggested, or similar words, are not supplied in 
construing this statute, then we must not only convict 
the Revisors and the Legislature of the inconsistency 
which we have mentioned, but we shall be giving to 
the Corporation Court a jurisdiction which the creators 
of that Court had deliberately taken from it, a juris-
diction, in fact, which was the very ground of the ex-
istence of the Court of Law and Chancery. Jurisdiction 
by inference, or by implication, is always to be avoided, 
and particularly in a case like this, where, as we have 
just stated, the draftsmen of the Act of February 12, 
1894, had deliberately taken from the Corporation 
Court, and given to a new court, the jurisdiction which 
it is now asserted has been restored to it. 
Chapter 244 of the Code deals with the jurisdiction 
of all the Corporation Courts of the State. By section 
5910, it is provided that all the Corporation Courts of 
the State, with the exception only of the Hustings Court 
of the City of Richmond, shall have the same juris-
diction in the respective cities as the Circuit Courts 
'have in the counties in which such cities are located. 
This statute confers both civil and criminal jurisdiction. 
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Yet it will hardly be contended that, because neither of 
the Corporation Courts of Norfolk were excepted from 
this statute, as was the Hustings Court of the City of 
Richmond, these two Norfolk courts have any other 
jurisdiction than that conferred by the statutes by which 
they were established. Hence, the plain intent of the 
Legislature, expressed by section 5910, is an intent anal-
ogous to that which we seek to sustain, namely: ttThe 
several Corporation Courts shall, within the cities for 
which they are established, have the same jurisdiction 
which the Circuit Courts have in the counties for which 
they are established, unless otherUJise limited by statute." 
The italicied words are our own. Now the general lan-
guage of section 5 91 0 of the Code is just as inconsistent 
with the provisions of the Act of February 12, 1894, 
as is the language of 52 59 of the Code. Both are plainly 
and admittedly inconsistent. Yet we have to construe 
these statutes so as to give effect to both if possible. 
The only way by which this can be done is to hold that 
the statutes creating the two Corporation Courts of 
Norfolk were intended to remain as they were, and 
that neither section 5259 nor section 5210 was intended 
to apply to them, except insofar as these two statutes 
were not inconsistent with 5935. Where statutes are 
in apparent conflict, they should be so construed as to 
give effect to that statute which is the very constitution 
itself of the Court rather than to make controlling a 
statute affecting directly the law of wills and touching 
only incidentally upon the jurisdiction of the Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAMES E. HEATH, 
Counsel for the Petitioner. 
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